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Hurricane Maria was a singular event in Puerto Rico’s history. The storm struck on September 20, 2017, and left unparalleled 
devastation in its wake. At least 2,975 people lost 
their lives in the storm and its aftermath. Property 
damage and lost economic output exceeded $95 
billion. The Trump administration’s emergency 
and recovery response was widely criticized as in-
adequate and mismanaged. Maria shattered many 
Puerto Ricans’ belief that the United States would 
never allow a humanitarian crisis to imperil the 
lives of its citizens.
The desultory response to the disaster has re-
vived a lingering debate over the viability of 
Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. It was a so-
bering reminder that Puerto Rico is not equal to 
the member states of the union. In fact, nothing 
has changed since 1901, when the Supreme Court 
ruled that Puerto Rico was merely “a territory ap-
purtenant and belonging to the United States, but 
not part of the United States.” Hurricane Maria 
laid bare the painful reality that Puerto Rico is an 
inconsequential American territory inhabited by 
second-class US citizens.
From its seizure by the United States in 1898 in 
the Spanish-American War until the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, Puerto Rico was a valu-
able strategic asset and a highly profitable invest-
ment site for US corporate capital. However, dur-
ing the past quarter-century Puerto Rico has seen 
its status as America’s shining star in the Caribbean 
slowly dim. The US Navy shuttered its sprawling 
base there over two decades ago after belatedly ac-
knowledging that it had become an anachronistic 
military asset unsuitable for training for modern 
warfare. Similarly, multinational corporations that 
once extracted great profits from Puerto Rico have 
essentially abandoned it.
Globalization and a reconceptualization of US 
strategic interests in a transformed geopolitical 
environment have had a devastating impact on 
the once prized territory. Through no fault of its 
own, Puerto Rico is no longer regarded as an ad-
vantageous possession by the United States. This 
change in Puerto Rico’s status in the American em-
pire ultimately made the island particularly vul-
nerable to Maria’s destructive force.
ECONOMIC SHOCKS
Hurricane Maria was the culmination of a se-
ries of shocks that hit Puerto Rico over the past 
decade and a half—a ruinous trifecta of economic 
crises. The first was set in motion in 1996, when 
President Bill Clinton signed legislation phasing 
out Section 936, a provision of the US tax code 
that granted an exemption for corporate income 
from operations in Puerto Rico. When the tax in-
centive expired in 2006, corporations abandoned 
the island and manufacturing employment plum-
meted.
In 2004, the Navy closed the sprawling Roos-
evelt Roads military complex. Thousands of jobs 
were lost, and the millions of dollars the Pentagon 
spent on construction and base operations stopped 
flowing into the local economy. Demilitarization 
aggravated the already precarious economic situ-
ation caused by the termination of Section 936. 
Both of these developments propelled Puerto Rico 
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into a depression starting in 2006. For 11 of the 
past 12 years, the island has endured negative 
growth rates.
With tax revenue depleted by the depression, 
successive Puerto Rican governments increased 
their reliance on municipal bonds to balance the 
budget and pay for essential public services, even 
as they sought to control costs by imposing auster-
ity. Out-migration increased markedly as the eco-
nomic crisis wore on, particularly among skilled 
and educated workers. The exodus further re-
duced the tax base.
As investment capital dried up, government offi-
cials worked with Wall Street financial firms to ag-
gressively market bond issues. Puerto Rico quickly 
amassed a staggering debt, which tripled from $25 
billion in 2000 to $74 billion by 2016. The gov-
ernment also had unfunded public-employee pen-
sion obligations of nearly $50 billion. Almost half 
the bond debt was acquired during the tenures of 
governors Luis Fortuño (2009–13) of the New Pro-
gressive Party, which advocates 
statehood, and Alejandro García 
Padilla (2013–17) of the Popu-
lar Democratic Party, which 
favors maintaining common-
wealth status.
On June 29, 2015, García Pa-
dilla shocked the bond market 
when he announced that Puer-
to Rico lacked the financial resources to meet its 
debt obligations. In April 2016, he warned that the 
island’s fiscal situation was “more dire than at any 
other point in its history” and it might be forced 
to choose between honoring its commitments to 
bondholders and continuing to provide residents 
with essential services. Congress acted quickly—
to protect the bondholders.
On July 1, 2016, President Barack Obama signed 
into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, 
and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The act 
established the Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Board (FOMB), known in Puerto Rico as la 
junta. The law gives the board, whose members are 
appointed by Congress and the president, broad 
powers over the local government’s fiscal and eco-
nomic policies.
The FOMB has the authority to order the gov-
ernment to implement its recommendations. It can 
block the enforcement or execution of certain con-
tracts, executive orders, and “any territorial law or 
regulation that is inconsistent with [PROMESA] or 
fiscal reform plans.” The junta’s seizure of the Puer-
to Rican government’s fiscal powers was the third 
shock that befell the island before Hurricane Maria.
Paul Ryan, then the speaker of the US House 
of Representatives and one of the architects of 
PROMESA, justified the legislation by asserting that 
Puerto Rico “paved the way for this disaster with 
decades of irresponsible policies like overspend-
ing and fiscal mismanagement.”
Likewise, President Donald Trump has regular-
ly disparaged Puerto Rican politicians as incompe-
tent and corrupt, a theme he has returned to since 
the hurricane. On October 23, 2018, he claimed 
that “inept politicians are trying to use . . . disaster 
funding to pay off other obligations.”
ERODING INFRASTRUCTURE
Puerto Ricans were stunned by the severity of 
the devastation that Hurricane Maria left in its 
wake. But the great loss of life and massive destruc-
tion cannot be explained solely by Maria’s wrath. 
Puerto Rico was woefully unprepared to protect 
itself from the fearsome pow-
er of a Category 4 hurricane. 
Well before Maria, its physical 
and human infrastructure was 
in a state of severe disrepair. 
For over a decade, the govern-
ment and public corporations 
curtailed spending for mainte-
nance of critical systems, par-
ticularly the electrical grid.
In 2009, the Fortuño administration pushed 
through the draconian Special Act to Declare a 
State of Fiscal Emergency in an effort to reduce 
the mounting budget deficit and prevent further 
deterioration of its credit rating. The measure 
was Puerto Rico’s first attempt to impose a severe 
neoliberal austerity program in order to shrink 
the state bureaucracy. Government funding was 
slashed by 20 percent. Tens of thousands of pub-
lic employees were dismissed, wages were frozen, 
union contracts were suspended, and worker 
benefits were curtailed. Many Puerto Ricans took 
part in demonstrations against Fortuño’s regres-
sive policies.
García Padilla followed suit, cutting spending 
on physical infrastructure as well as the already 
stressed human infrastructure: education, health 
and hospitals, sanitation, and nutrition services. 
He increased the sales tax and imposed a new tax 
on services which had a disproportionate impact 
on the working and middle classes. About 50 per-
cent of the revenue from these taxes was used to 
Puerto Rico has been 
undergoing systemic 
depopulation.
service the debt. The government also cut invest-
ments in roads, water-treatment facilities, public 
schools, and other critical infrastructure from $2.4 
billion in 2012 to $906 million in 2017. The uni-
versity budget was slashed by 20 percent. 
Although the combined Fortuño and García Pa-
dilla austerity measures failed to reduce the debt, 
they increased unemployment, income inequality, 
and poverty while reducing public services for the 
most vulnerable members of society. After years of 
systematically defunding its physical and human 
infrastructure, Puerto Rico was highly vulnerable 
to a catastrophic storm like Hurricane Maria.
A COLONIAL ECONOMY
On the surface, Puerto Rico may have appeared 
to be a modern Caribbean society that could with-
stand and recover quickly from a major hurricane. 
But Maria ripped off the thin veneer of modernity 
and exposed the fault lines in contemporary colo-
nialism.
For over 120 years, Congress has denied Puerto 
Rico self-rule and the authority to control its po-
litical economy. Since Puerto Rico is prohibited 
by the United States from filing for relief under 
Chapter 9 of the federal bankruptcy code (which 
is intended for municipalities), it enacted its own 
bankrupcy law in 2014. The bondholders sued 
Puerto Rico, and the US Supreme Court sided with 
them in 2016, ruling that federal law superseded 
the Puerto Rican bankruptcy law. However, the 
PROMESA bill contains a provision (Title III) that 
allows the FOMB to file a petition for debt restruc-
turing in federal court on behalf of Puerto Rico.
The limited fiscal autonomy that Congress had 
unofficially conferred in 1952 was stripped away 
by PROMESA. Since it is not sovereign, Puerto Rico 
cannot join the International Monetary Fund, en-
ter into international treaties, or obtain emergency 
lending or development funds from multilateral 
lending institutions.
Because Puerto Rico has no voting member in 
the US Congress, the federal government enacts 
policies that literally have life-or-death conse-
quences for Puerto Ricans without their consent. 
This form of colonialism has saddled Puerto Rico 
with an economy that is on life support, depen-
dent on continuous infusions of American corpo-
rate capital and federal transfers.
In 1947, Puerto Rico initiated a successful “in-
dustrialization by invitation” development pro-
gram, dubbed Operation Bootstrap, which attract-
ed hundreds of US-owned factories to the island. 
In order to sustain the confidence of investors, the 
Puerto Rican government had to prioritize cor-
porate profitability. Acting through self-financed 
state-owned corporations, it established a modern 
infrastructure that offered private firms subsidized 
services vital to their operations.
Between 1947 and 1963, the island’s annual 
GDP growth rate was 6.6 percent, which exceeded 
that of the United States. The economy continued 
to grow rapidly over the next decade, increasing 
at an average annual rate of 7.7 percent from 1964 
through 1973, and reaching an all-time high of 
13.8 percent in 1971.
During the Cold War, Puerto Rico was portrayed 
as an “economic miracle” and used in a global ide-
ological campaign against communism and the 
nonaligned movement. The territory was held up 
as proof positive that small, labor-abundant, open 
economies could develop industrially under Amer-
ican tutelage. However, as the historian Gordon 
Lewis has pointed out, Puerto Rico’s industrializa-
tion was the result of “artificial advantages” that 
flowed from its colonial status.
Its growth was possible because corpora-
tions investing in Puerto Rico were beneficiaries 
of preferential federal tax legislation, as well as 
low wages, industrial subsidies and incentives, 
and other inducements including tax exemp-
tions granted by the Puerto Rican government. 
An array of other “artificial advantages” accruing 
to Puerto Rico because of its status as a colony 
facilitated growth, such as the common curren-
cy and customs system, unrestricted emigration 
to the United States, and billions of dollars in 
federal transfers: Medicaid, Social Security, and 
veterans pensions, direct aid (such as nutrition 
assistance), and subsidies for the Puerto Rican 
administration’s operations.
Unemployment was kept at tolerable levels be-
cause robust labor markets in the United States 
attracted Puerto Rican workers. The government 
sponsored this migration. During the “Great Mi-
gration” of 1950–60, 470,000 Puerto Ricans left 
the island.
However, the rapid pace of postwar economic 
growth could not be sustained. Growth plummeted 
to 1.7 percent annually during the 1973–77 reces-
sion. By the mid-1970s, Puerto Rico was no longer 
an internationally competitive site for American 
manufacturing capital. Many labor-intensive firms 
relocated to newly industrializing countries where 
they could enjoy higher profit margins thanks to 
much lower wages.
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The removal of surplus population through 
emigration, along with federal transfers and sub-
sidies, prevented Puerto Rico’s social fabric from 
unraveling and allowed local elites to maintain 
the fiction that they were effectively managing the 
economy. Yet it was not only successive local ad-
ministrations that were reluctant to extricate the 
island from a flawed development model. The 
federal government was unwilling to grant Puerto 
Rico the autonomy it needed to formulate alterna-
tive approaches.
But Puerto Rico was developing into a political 
embarrassment for the United States. The increas-
ing unemployment and poverty on the island, the 
growing exodus of Puerto Ricans, and height-
ened political agitation over economic and social 
inequalities revealed deep problems in the once 
valued colony. The New York Times commented 
in 1976 that the “heady days of ‘Operation Boot-
strap,’ when Puerto Rico was hailed as a model for 
developing small countries, are definitely over.”
During this period of economic decline and po-
litical tension, Congress enacted Section 936 in 
1976 to promote investment by different industri-
al sectors. The provision induced capital-intensive 
companies to invest in Puerto Rico by allowing 
them to retain profits free of federal taxes. Manu-
facturers of electronics, medical devices, and par-
ticularly pharmaceuticals took advantage of the 
tax exemption and flocked to the island. However, 
these heavily capitalized firms had a marginal im-
pact on manufacturing employment since they es-
sentially replaced the more labor-intensive firms 
that had abandoned Puerto Rico.
In series of reports starting in 1978, the US Trea-
sury Department concluded that the tax provision 
was depriving the federal government of billions 
of dollars in tax revenue, while the firms benefit-
ing from the incentive failed to generate sufficient 
employment to justify their gains. Twenty years 
after Section 936 was enacted, Clinton ordered a 
10-year phaseout of the law. Investments in manu-
facturing dwindled.
The termination of Section 936 signaled the be-
ginning of the end of Puerto Rico’s manufacturing-
based economy and forced the government to rely 
on debt financing to generate the revenue it des-
perately needed to sustain its operations. But non-
stop borrowing and subsequent defaults prompted 
the credit-rating agenices to steadily downgrade 
Puerto Rican bonds until the island government 
was locked out of the credit markets. Its economic 
fate would be decided by the FOMB.
DRACONIAN DOWNSIZING
In October 2018, more than a year after Maria, 
the FOMB released a fiscal plan to put Puerto Rico 
on the path to financial solvency. The junta will 
downsize the public bureaucracy, close and con-
solidate hospitals, privatize public corporations, 
eliminate worker-protection legislation, and make 
other changes that will transform Puerto Rico’s 
economy and society.
According to the FOMB, “increasing labor force 
participation and job creation may be the single 
most important reform for long-term economic 
well-being in Puerto Rico.” Law 80, which im-
poses penalties on employers that dismiss work-
ers without cause, is anathema to the junta. To in-
crease the workforce, the junta asserts that Puerto 
Rico will need to become an “at-will employment” 
jurisdiction. 
The FOMB also maintains that generous social 
welfare benefits contribute to the low labor par-
ticipation rate, since “working in the informal sec-
tor and collecting transfer benefits” can “result in 
higher effective income than working in the for-
mal sector.” Thus, the junta proposes welfare re-
forms that will reward “citizens who participate in 
the formal economy.” The fiscal plan also calls for 
a 10-percent cut in the public pension system and 
a 30-percent cut in funding for public services.
The labor-market reforms proposed in this plan 
are so unpopular that the legislature, controlled by 
the pro-statehood party, has refused to approve en-
abling legislation. However, in October the FOMB 
certified the fiscal plan over the opposition of Gov-
ernor Ricardo Rosello. “This is not a fiscal plan for 
economic development, this is an austerity plan,” 
Rosello complained. While he conceded that the 
plan will generate savings, Rosello said that the 
“money will be available to bondholders, but to 
the detriment of the most vulnerable of our peo-
ple. This is simply unfair.”
One key institution targeted in the junta’s aus-
terity drive is the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), 
an island-wide, 11-campus system with nearly 
60,000 students. The FOMB’s plan for the univer-
sity will cut its allocation of government funding 
by $211 million, about a third of its budget. The 
system will be consolidated into fewer campuses, 
tuition doubled, fees increased, and student en-
rollment cut. The teaching staff will be reduced as 
well.
These cuts will gut the university system, erode 
its ability to conduct research, and result in fewer 
graduates prepared to teach in the public schools 
and work in government agencies or business 
management. By doubling tuition, the junta will 
radically diminish the university’s capacity to con-
tinue serving as one of the key channels of upward 
social mobility for Puerto Rico’s poor.
The assault on the university system offers an 
insight into the FOMB’s plans for Puerto Rico’s 
economy, particularly its human capital needs. UPR 
educates the vast majority of the island’s public-
sector employees, including health professionals. 
The FOMB envisions a streamlined or “right-sized” 
state that will provide fewer public services, an 
economy in which public corporations are disman-
tled or privatized, and a low-wage private sector 
that will need far fewer educated workers for man-
agement positions. 
Three successive governments have reduced 
public-sector employment and reformed labor 
laws to decrease wages and weaken job protec-
tions. Even under the best-case scenario, Puerto 
Rico will experience negative growth for at least 
several more years, so employment prospects for 
educated workers are dim.
The situation for Puerto 
Ricans will deteriorate fur-
ther when federal transfers 
are reduced in five years and 
hurricane-related funding is 
exhausted. The austerity mea-
sures will lead to further emi-
gration of the most skilled and valued workers. 
The FOMB is restructuring capitalist develop-
ment in the colony as it conducts an experiment in 
social engineering. Whatever economic model lies 
in Puerto Rico’s future, it will be based on extract-
ing more value from a vulnerable labor force. Act-
ing as the federal government’s fiscal enforcement 
agent, the junta’s task is to create a new techno-
cratic state that will ensure Puerto Rico subsidizes 
its continued colonial subordination. The costs of 
maintaining the colony must be borne by its in-
habitants.
Although many economists argue that the 
FOMB’s fiscal plan will not generate economic 
growth for some time, it is virtually certain that 
it will remain in place until a settlement has been 
reached with the hedge funds and institutional in-
vestors that hold most of Puerto Rico’s debt. But 
forcibly aligning the labor market to the needs of 
US business interests, as the government reduces 
vital public services, is politically risky and can 
generate resistance. The proposed changes are so 
drastic that any democratically elected govern-
ment that implements them will lose legitimacy 
and popular support.
EXODUS
Hurricane Maria accelerated the exodus of 
Puerto Ricans that began in 2004 when the econo-
my started to contract and the government began 
dismissing thousands of public-sector employees. 
After 2010, as the US economy recovered from the 
Great Recession, out-migration intensified. Eco-
nomic and social conditions had become unbear-
able for many Puerto Ricans mired in joblessness 
and poverty, with a dilapidated infrastructure and 
rapidly deteriorating public health-care and school 
systems. In April 2010, the official unemployment 
rate was just shy of 17 percent, and almost half the 
population was living in poverty.
During the past decade and a half, the numbers 
of Puerto Ricans migrating to the United States 
exceeded the numbers that left during the “Great 
Migration” of the 1950s. The Pew Foundation 
has reported that between 2005 and 2015, about 
446,000 Puerto Ricans migrat-
ed to the mainland. By 2015, 
the population had declined by 
more than 10 percent from its 
peak of 3.8 million in 2004. 
An estimated 130,000 peo-
ple, almost 4 percent of the 
population, migrated to the 
mainland between July 2017 and July 2018, with 
the largest numbers leaving in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Maria. The Center for Puerto Rican 
Studies estimates that between 2017 and 2019, 
Puerto Rico may lose 14 percent of its population, 
about 470,000 people.
For the first time in its history, Puerto Rico has 
been undergoing systemic depopulation. Current-
ly, more Puerto Ricans live in the United States 
(5.4 million) than in Puerto Rico (3.2 million), 
and the growth of the US resident population will 
easily outpace that of the island. Puerto Ricans are 
leaving because they envision a dystopian future 
for their homeland.
The social and economic impact of the post-
Maria exodus on Puerto Rico’s future economic 
growth will be serious. College-educated and 
skilled Puerto Ricans are leaving in unprecedent-
ed numbers. A rising death rate among an older 
age distribution together with a declining fertility 
rate will further shrink the population. There is 
little prospect for a sustainable economic recovery 
given the continued depletion of the island’s hu-
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man capital: its teachers, doctors and health care 
professionals, engineers and technicians, and ex-
perienced managers.
The FOMB’s policies further encourage out- 
migration. Many of the measures enacted by both 
the junta and the local government create oppres-
sive labor-market conditions that will spur young 
people to leave the island. The huge contraction of 
the public-sector workforce has reduced employ-
ment opportunities. The attack on UPR and the 
public education system discourages young fami-
lies from staying in Puerto Rico. In short, a ruth-
less austerity regime has been imposed to achieve 
fiscal solvency and to promote the migration of 
Puerto Ricans who will have no role in the restruc-
tured economy envisioned by the junta.
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM
The Rosello administration was roundly criti-
cized for failing to prepare for Hurricane Maria 
and for its incompetence in staging the emergency 
response. However, the stron-
gest criticisms were directed 
at the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration 
(FEMA), which was excoriated 
for its handling of the crisis 
and held responsible for hun-
dreds of deaths. Investigations 
conducted by the Government 
Accounting Office, FEMA itself, and independent 
agencies concluded that FEMA’s response ranged 
from incompetent to negligent. (Trump was an ex-
ception, congratulating FEMA for doing “an unap-
preciated great job.”)
By contrast, when Hurricane Harvey hit the 
Houston area a month before Maria struck Puerto 
Rico, FEMA had quickly deployed more person-
nel and allocated greater resources to Texas. Three 
months after Maria, the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights reported that it was “deeply 
dismayed by the United States’ lack of response to 
effectively protect the human rights of the Puerto 
Rican people.” When criticized for the federal gov-
ernment’s bungled emergency relief effort, Trump 
blamed Puerto Ricans, tweeting: “They want ev-
erything to be done for them when it should be a 
community effort.”
In fact, rather than waiting for government as-
sistance, Puerto Ricans reacted quickly. Through-
out the island, residents organized relief and re-
covery campaigns. They established self-managed 
Centros de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Aid Centers or 
CAMs) that pooled resources and raised money to 
meet the urgent need for food, water, and medical 
supplies and for recovery and rebuilding. Faced 
with what organizers called “the collapse of the 
state and the abuses of FEMA in post-Maria Puerto 
Rico,” they also set up “discussion spaces to gen-
erate critical thinking and the understanding that 
we are facing a political disaster that is even more 
dangerous than the natural disaster.” Technologi-
cally savvy Puerto Ricans established the Red de 
Apoyo Mutuo (Network for Mutual Assistance) to 
serve as an independent platform for the CAMs and 
diaspora organizations to “communicate, collabo-
rate, and coordinate their decentralized activities.”
Puerto Ricans in the United States organized a 
nationwide emergency assistance campaign to help 
the people on the devastated island as soon as the 
hurricane struck. Community-based advocacy or-
ganizations raised substantial donations and col-
lected vital supplies for shipment to the island. 
Puerto Ricans in the diaspora responded more im-
mediately and effectively to the 
crisis than the federal govern-
ment did.
This post-Maria community 
response has been ground-
breaking in its scale and also 
because it was organized out-
side the spaces controlled by 
the local government and feder-
al agencies operating in Puerto Rico. The unmedi-
ated and spontaneous engagement between Puerto 
Ricans on the mainland and on the island may also 
be a bellwether of a new form of anticolonial activ-
ism. The closer connection between the diaspora 
and the colony made possible by new social media 
technologies has transformed the scale and fre-
quency of Puerto Rican trans national interaction.
REIMAGINING THE FUTURE
The flow of people, knowledge, and supplies 
managed by autonomous organizations was fo-
cused on hurricane-recovery efforts, but also of-
fers a glimpse of a more sustainable and resilient 
Puerto Rico with diminished reliance on US capital 
and the federal government. This novel form of 
cultural politics is quickly dismantling the artifi-
cial divisions that historically have been manufac-
tured by Puerto Rico’s political leadership to seg-
regate boricuas residing in the United States from 
those on the island.
The idea that Puerto Ricans are a divided na-
tion, and that they constitute two linguistically and 
Maria exposed 
the fault lines in 
contemporary colonialism.
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culturally separate peoples, was always question-
able—but now it has been debunked. Nowhere is 
the fallacy of a divided nation more evident than 
in the way the diaspora community has embraced 
the hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans who 
have sought refuge and a new life in United States. 
Hurricane Maria revealed that Puerto Ricans in 
the colony and in the diaspora embrace a common 
national identity. Puerto Rican identity is defined 
by distinctive cultural and linguistic attributes and 
by the shared history of a colonized and racialized 
people. 
However, the current crisis has generated un-
precedented migration, a virtually complete col-
lapse of the local economy, and harsh austerity 
measures that are creating a dystopian level of 
precarity not experienced since the 1930s. This 
has led to the realization that the viability of Puer-
to Rican society and its distinctive way of life is 
threatened. Growing numbers of Puerto Ricans in 
the diaspora and on the island believe that the old 
colonial arrangement is untenable. A new political 
arrangement with the United States is necessary—
one that acknowledges Puerto Rican national 
identity as unbounded by geography. 
But colonialism denies the residents of Puerto 
Rico the political means to redefine the terms 
of their association with the United States and 
shape the future of their island nation. The dias-
pora community, dispersed throughout the United 
States, also lacks the political power to shift fed-
eral policy.
Puerto Ricans migrate between one identity 
as colonized subjects, with its embedded tropes 
of inferiority, and another racialized identity that 
is denigrated and marginalized in the American 
white-supremacist social order. One of the most 
persistent colonial representations of Puerto Ri-
cans is that they are a “dependent people” inca-
pable of surviving on their own. But instead of fall-
ing into hopelessness and fatalism in the days and 
months following Maria, Puerto Ricans displayed 
activism and resilience—refuting this degrading 
depiction.
Puerto Ricans on the island and in the diaspora 
are more skeptical now than ever about the state-
hood and commonwealth parties’ fanciful claims 
that they alone can persuade the United States 
to ease its colonial control over Puerto Rico. If 
Washington chooses to revisit the long-standing 
colonial formula, it will do so for two reasons. 
First, Puerto Rico is inconsequential to Ameri-
can economic and geopolitical interests, and too 
costly to sustain. And second, popular activism, 
resistance, and self-sufficiency will permanently 
damage the credibility of the island’s ideologically 
bankrupt political parties. Hurricane Maria ex-
posed the failings of the current colonial system 
and has created new space for the people to re-
imagine Puerto Rico’s political future. ■
